Of the post-Maimonidean philosophers Crescas is the last who contributes original views of philosophical value.
Accordingly Crescas goes back to the religious doctrine of reward and punishment as ordinarily understood.
He may have been a pupil of Manasseh, but his mind was nurtured on the philosophical treatises of Maimonides and Crescas.
It is of interest here to know that Spinoza, as has been shown by Joel, owed his idea of man's freedom to Crescas.
Crescas appeared as if by magic—Psis act like that—and had me by the arm.
Here also appears clearly the anti-intellectualism of Crescas and his disagreement with Maimonides and Gersonides.
Crescas, we have seen, defends God's knowledge of particulars, hence he sees no difficulty in special providence on this score.
We will select a few of the more important topics and state briefly Crescas's attitude.
The work of Crescas, though it had no immediate success, ended in effecting its liberation.
He rehashes the problems which occupied a Maimonides, a Gersonides and a Crescas, and sides now with one, now with the other.