It is here that the relation of the hypothetic transformistic principle to our concept of entelechy is concerned.
The soul, Aristotle defines as the first entelechy of the body.
This intrinsic energy is the entelechy, substantial form, or what is popularly called the soul.
That is why, if we do grant the existence of an entelechy, it must be inseparable from the body.
entelechy works as if it were reasonable and acted with a set purpose.
In every other monad, the entelechy, or energy, is but one factor.
Besides, as the soul is indivisible, the entelechy of the divisible body could not become divisible as is the body.
What then undergoes change in phylogeny, the means or the entelechy?
Matter is essential to any entelechy, and can never be separated from it, since matter completes it.
We at present are dealing with entelechy in a quasi-popular manner.