You show that it is impossible with consistency to admit the premisses and at the same time deny the conclusion.
A Retinend, asserted in the premisses to exist, may be so asserted in the Conclusion.
In Wittnesse of the premisses I have hereunto sett my hand and caused the seale of the Colony to be afixed.
These premisses, as they stand, will give no Conclusion, as they are both negative.
In both, the premisses or principia of syllogisms must be put together in the same manner, in order to make the syllogism valid.
But I think this inference is not justified by the premisses.
But whatever the Figure of the premisses, only two terms can be distributed.
But the premisses of Plato here do not sustain his inference.
The formal statement of these premisses and conclusion is the Inductive Syllogism.
Are they not bound to remain infected with the doubts which beset their premisses?
late 14c., in logic, "a previous proposition from which another follows," from Old French premisse (14c.), from Medieval Latin premissa (propositio or sententia) "(the proposition) set before," noun use of fem. past participle of Latin praemittere "send forward, put before," from prae "before" (see pre-) + mittere "to send" (see mission). In legal documents it meant "matter previously stated" (early 15c.), which in deeds or wills often was a house or building, hence the extended meaning "house or building, with grounds" (1730).
"to state before something else," mid-15c., from premise (n.). Related: Premised; premising.