We have to recognise two tendencies in Kant, subjectivist and phenomenalist.
The teaching of the first sentence is phenomenalist; that of the other is subjectivist.
The two chief tendencies which thus conflicted in Kants mind may be named the subjectivist and the phenomenalist respectively.
But in this passage it allows only of a subjectivist interpretation, whereby sensations are appearance.
Such an inference only follows if the subjectivist standpoint be accepted to the exclusion of the phenomenalist point of view.
The subjectivist doctrine of the transcendental object is there expressed in a much more uncompromising manner.
But even that teaching it restates in such fashion as to free it from subjectivist implications.
They must no longer be interpreted in subjectivist terms, as originating in the separate existence of an individual self.
Quite frequently it is the subjectivist solution which Kant seems to adopt.
The latter proof depends upon this subjectivist reference; the present proof does not.